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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
REFORM: COLLECTED PROPOSALS AND
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES
Brian Cox
"We cannot continue to run the world based on
countries that won a war 60 years ago. It's either
destructive competition or cooperation. We live in an
interdependent world and the only way to move
forward is to cooperate.,,'

On January 30, 2009, the United Nations (UN) once again took
up Koffi Annan's call 2 and began plodding the slow march towards
reform of the United Nations Security Council. 3 While these steps are
but the groundwork rules for future negotiations, they are an important
indication that, despite enormous obstacles, the desire for change
is at
4
least still alive and may ever so gently be gathering momentum.
Where will this momentum carry the world, or rather the states of
the world? To answer this question we must look forward to the
possible consequences of changing the Council, the foundation of
modern peace. Any look forward should first be informed by a look
back to the motivations underlying the establishment of the Council.
For this article's purpose, history can be split into halves at the
moment the United Nations Charter was signed and the Security

1 Simon Hooper, Annan: Worldfaces 'Crisis of Governance,' CNN.com,

http://www.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/01/28/davos.wef.annan/index.html
visited Apr. 10, 2009).
2

(last

See The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,

Security and Human Rights for All
167-70, U.N. Doc. A/29/2005 (Mar. 21,
2005), availableat http://www.un.org/largerfreedomi/chap5.htm.

3 Lydia Stewart, First Informal Plenary of the General Assembly on
Security Council Reform Underway, Center for UN Reform,

http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/385 (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
4 See H.E. Miguel D'escoto Brockmann, President, United Nations
General Assembly, Presentation to An Informal Plenary Session of the General
Assembly (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.reformtheun.org/
index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileld=3565 ("Member States,
125 in total, demonstrated an overwhelming and across-the-board appetite to
start intergovernmental negotiations [to reform the Security Council] in
informal plenary of the General Assembly.").
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Council created.5 Prior to 1945, the world was an arena of total
sovereigns, each wielding a legitimate right to solve conflict with
aggressive warfare; after 1945, those sovereigns, by a mutual
agreement, began surrendering that right-- if not for principled reasons
of law and humanity, then for practical security reasons. World War II
painfully demonstrated civilization's power for self-destruction through
the unrestrained use of force.6 In 1945, a restraint was created in the
form of the Security Council. Caution demands that any proposed
changes to the form of this restraint should be scrutinized closely. This
article collects and examines the various proposals for reform
circulated in recent years.
Part I focuses on the purpose of the Security Council. This part
examines the terms of the Charter, the motivations behind the author of
these terms, and how these terms are executed by the Council with
regard to its most important power: the authorization of the use of
force. In particular, Part I looks at the difference between the Council's

5 Compare THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 350-56 (Richard
Crawly trans., T.E. Wick ed., New York: Modem Library 1982) (wherein the
Athenians frankly explain to the Melians that there is no right or wrong in the
Athenian decision to make war upon the Melians, and the decision is based
simply on strategy and strength) and HUGO GROTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND
PEACE 31-34, 36 (Archibald C. Campbell trans. 1901), available at
http:/ibooks.google.com/books?id=bOwuAAAAMAAJ&dq=hugo+grotius+rig
hts+of+war&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=ltcsYXWuXt&sig=XdClxh
ORxt6ieND2bvan92jNPeE&hl=en&ei=ZRmSbvlLoWjtge8h4SYAg&sa=X&
oi=bookresult&ct-result&resnum=4#PPP16,M1 (arguing that war, even war
in order to acquire necessary and useful things, is a natural principle and not a
crime as long as the agreed upon formalities are observed) with U.N. Charter
art. 2 and the Agreement Between The United States of America and the
French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and Northern Ireland,
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Respecting the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,
59 Stat. 1544, Art 6 (laying personal responsibility for waging wars of
aggression on leaders of nations).
6 Dorothy V. Jones, Sober Expectations: The United Nations and a
"Sensible Machinery " for Peace, in THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1944 - 1994, at, 11 (Ernest R. May & Angeliki E.
Laiou eds., Harvard Univ. Press, 1998) ("This time they would be 'sensible.'
They would learn from the past. They would build power into an international
structure, and that power would enable the organization to keep the peace. The
League of Nations had failed . . .[the Allied powers] would not - they dared
not - fail again."). Albert Einstein is credited with saying: "I don't know what
weapons will be used in World War III, but World War IV will be fought with
sticks and stones."
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intended function of peace enforcement and its current more dominant
mode ofpeacekeeping.
Part II lays out the proposals to reform the Council,
concentrating on plans that are or were actually before the United
Nations, including the Razali plan, the Model A and B plans, the new
G-4 plan, the United for Consensus plan, the Ezulwini Consensus plan,
the S5 plan, and the Overarching Process plan. Part II also examines
minor plans which have already been rejected and a few scholarly
suggestions.
In Part II1, the article measures the proposed changes against the
purported goals of the reform and the original purpose of the Security
Council. This part examines the benefits and detriments of each
change and whether, if the reform is implemented, the primary peace
enforcement concern of the Council would be affected.

I. THE CURRENT SECURITY COUNCIL
A. THE TERMS OF THE CHARTER
The primary purpose of the United Nations is to "maintain
international peace and security [using] collective measures for the
prevention and removal of the threats to the peace, and for the
,,7
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace ....
The Security Council is the principal organ charged with this mission.8
As such, the Charter delivers express powers to the Council for
fulfillment of this duty. Those powers include the right to investigate
situations to determine if a threat to international security exists;9 the
right to suggest appropriate terms for peaceful settlements to disputes; 10
the right to declare "the existence of a threat to the peace or act of
aggression"; and the right to propose solutions to a threat, including

7U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
8

The General Assembly has a fall back responsibility according to the

"Uniting for Peace" theory. Under this process, if the Security Council fails to
act due to a veto, the General Assembly is free to exercise their secondary
responsibility to authorize some action less than those specifically given to the
Council. Peacekeeping, for example, can originate in the General Assembly.
See NoRRrE MACQUEEN, THE UNITED NATIONS SINCE 1945: PEACEKEEPING AND
THE COLD WAR 17-19, 24-25 (Addison Wesley Longman Limited 1999).
9U.N. Charter art. 34.
'0U.N.Charter art. 37, para. 2.
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armed force,"' "1 and

military action.12
3
Five of these membersThe Council seats fifteen members.'
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Russian
14
The
Federation-are permanent members empowered with a veto.
remaining members are elected from particular regions laid out
5
Traditionally,
according to an "equitable geographical distribution."'
these seats are distributed as follows: two to Asia, three to Africa, two
to Latin America and the Caribbean, two to Western Europe and others,
and one to Eastern Europe. The non-permanent members hold their
16
Every
seats for two years and cannot be immediately re-elected.
7
member gets one vote. 1 Any action taken or authorized by the Council
must receive nine votes, but substantive matters, as opposed to
procedural matters, must pass without a permanent member exercising
its veto.' 8 An abstention by a permanent member does not constitute a
veto. 19

"1U.N. Charter art. 39.
12 U.N. Charter art. 42. The Security Council has at least ten duties and
powers expressed in the Charter. The powers mentioned in the text deal with
peace enforcement duties, the others are more organizational in nature. See
U.N. Charter art. 26 (creating an armaments regulation system); U.N. Charter
art. 4 (regarding the induction of new States); U.N. Charter art. 6 (regarding
the expulsion of States for constant violations of the Charter); U.N. Charter art.
83 (regarding operation of the UN's duties as a trustee over "strategic areas");
U.N Charter art. 97 (regarding procedures on how to suggest to the General
Assembly the selection of the Secretary-General); Statute of the International
Court of Justice art. 4.(explaining procedures surrounding the election of the
Judges of the International Court of Justice in conjunction with the General
Assembly).
13 As of Apr. 10 2009,
the members are Austria, Burkina Faso, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Turkey, Vietnam,
Uganda, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the
U.N.
Security
Council
Members,
Russian
Federation.
http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). The original
Security Council had only eleven seats, but was expanded in 1963. See G.A.
Res. 1991 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/49/965 (Dec. 17, 1963).
14U.N. Charter arts. 23, para. l& 27.
'" U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1
' 6 1d.
'7

U.N. Charter art. 27.

18 See id.

19Yehuda Z. Blum, Proposalsfor UN Security Council Reform, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 632, 636 (2005).
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Procedural matters seem to include at least those matters that
touch the administration and conduct of the Security Council, such as
setting a schedule or determining how business shall be conducted,
while substantive matters concern, at a minimum, the application of
powers or responsibilities vested by the Charter. 20 Deciding whether
any matter falling between these minimums is "procedural" or
"substantive" is itself considered a substantive question. 2'
Amendments to the Charter must be approved by a two-thirds majority
of all member states, including all five permanent members of the
Council.22
B. THE NEGOTIATIONS
The Charter is a product of hard bargaining between the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union.23 The three
states crafted a delicate balance that protected each party's particular
interests while leaving mostly uncompromised the ultimate goal of
establishing an organization capable of enforcing world peace. The
resulting treaty was open for any nation willing to join, 24 but only on
the condition that the joining state sacrifice to the drafting powers its
sovereign right to make war.25 The philosophical foundation of the
United Nations 26 is therefore based on the bargain offered by the Allied
20 Compare Provisional

Rules of Procedure of the Security Council R. 3034, UN Doc. S/96/Rev. 7 (1983), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/
scrules.htm (discussing rules on the Conduct of Business) with U.N. Charter
art. 27, paras. 2-3(saying that "all other matters" than procedural matters,
presumably including the express matters in the Charter, must pass subject to
the veto power).

21 C. Eduardo Vargas Toro, UN Security Council Reform: Unrealistic
and
Viable
Reform
Options, AmericanDiplomacy.org,

Proposals

http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200/41138.html.
22 U.N. Charter arts. 108, 109.
23 See, e.g., ROBERT C. HILDEBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS 209(The Univ. of
N.C. Press 1990); Michael Howard, The United Nations: From War Fighting to
Peace Planning, in THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS AND THE UNITED

NATIONS 1944 - 1994, 11 (Ernest R. May & Angeliki E. Laiou eds., Harvard
Univ. Press, 1998) (noting at least two issues that required ongoing
negotiations).
24 U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1.
25
See U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3-4.
26 See U.N. Charter Pmbl. ("We the People of the United Nations

Determined/to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind . . ./AND FOR
THESE ENDS/to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another
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powers to the world: Give sole authority over the use of force to a
single
body and that body will give you a world secure from world
27
war.
That responsible body is the Security Council. Originally, the
negotiating powers had very different ideas of what form the Council
would take. By examining the motivations, worries, and thought
processes of these powers, we can better understand the reasoning
behind the current Council structure and the impact of any changes
imposed thereon.
1. THE AMERICAN POSITION

The United States envisioned a Security Council not unlike the
current one. President Roosevelt espoused the idea of the "Four
Policeman," the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
and China, making up a separate body within the United Nations that
would have "exclusive authority to decide on the use of force." 28 This
council's sole responsibility would be peace enforcement. 29 A separate
Executive Council, composed of the Policemen and six or seven
representatives chosen according to region, would deal with nonmilitary matters. 30 Both councils would be separate from the General
Assembly. 31 Roosevelt's view was a reiteration of Wilson's League of
Nations philosophy reinforced by a heavy dose of strong-arm

as good neighbors, and/to unite our strength to maintain international peace and
security, and/to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of
methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest...
/HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH
THESE AIMS.").
27 See Jones, supra note 6, at 12 (describing the "power-based
expectations" of the drafting powers embodied in the proposals presented to the
lesser powers and how, though these powers pushed for the addition of more
rules to "guide state behavior," they could not affect the membership or power
of the Security Council); TOWNSEND HOOPES & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, FDR AND
THE CREATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

207 (Yale Univ. Press 1997) (small

States "viewed the U.N. as a means of strengthening their collective influence
and security...").
28 HOOPES, supra note 27, at 100.
29 Id. This enforcement body, under Roosevelt's view, was to have total
authority on the use of force. The State Department however, viewed the body
as "being subject to the guidance, recommendations, and general supervision of
the Executive
Council." Id.
30
id.
31Id.
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practicality. 32 President Roosevelt maintained a firm belief that peace
could be held only by the willingness to use "'overwhelming military
power[,]' and so the "Big Four - primarily or exclusively - would
hold and wield the military power to prevent or punish future
aggression; the peace would necessarily be based on Big Four primacy,
which [Roosevelt] argued would be benign." 33 This view specifically
conflicts with the modem, popular conceit that the United Nations is, in
all aspects, "based on sovereign equality and must permit the smaller
nations a meaningful role." 34 However, while President Roosevelt
routinely expressed that "small nations should not be allowed to
complicate the supreme task of keeping the peace," 35 he also believed
that the Big Four should champion the rights of those states.36 Thus,
the American position was a compromise between those two poles:
equality of sovereign nations under the principles of the Charter in
everything, on the one hand, and the use of force, which Roosevelt saw
as the guarantor of the other principles of Charter, on the other.
2. THE BRITISH POSITION
The British negotiators originally wanted three regional councils,
one each for Europe, Asia, and the Americas, charged with enforcing
regional security and collective responsibility as a Supreme United
Nations Council. 37 This tiered system would allow the regional
councils to enforce peace locally and "avoid having 'every nation
poking its finger into every other nation's business .... "'38
Later the British goals shifted to balancing European power
against the Soviet Union and to protecting the British Empire from
being dissolved by independence and self-determination at the end of

32 See id. at 9 (reflecting that the root of his ideas stemmed from his time
arguing in support of the League of Nations but in terms of "practical
necessity").
13 Id. at 108-09.

34 id.

31 Id. at 100.
36 Zi Zhongyun, Big Power Assurance of Peace Versus the Principle of
Equality among All Nations, in THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS AND
THE UNITED NATIONS 1944 - 1994, 11 (Ernest R. May & Angeliki E. Laiou

eds., Harvard Univ. Press, 1998).
37 Id.; HILDEBRAND, supra note 22, at 55 (called by Churchill a "tripod of
world38peace").
HILDEBRAND, supra note 22, at 55 (quoting Churchill).
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the war.39 The British ultimately viewed the Security Council and the
United Nations less as a new system of international relations and more
as an added tool in traditional diplomacy.4 °
3. THE SOVIET POSITION
Originally, the Soviets "favored a straight military alliance with
the United States and Britain" rather than a United Nations that "would
'assume the right to decide the fate of all other peoples."' 4 1 Indeed, to
the Soviets the earliest proposals may have looked like an
institutionalization of the war-time alliance cloaked in "democratic
trappings., 42 As long as the final form of the United Nations did not
endanger the security or hegemonic ambition of a newly strong Soviet
Union, Stalin was willing to join the organization. 43 However, the
Soviets maintained an absolute, insoluble position on maintaining an
unrestricted power of the veto.
The Soviets were willing
to
44
compromise on almost all points except the unanimity principle.
4. DETERMINING THE PERMANENT MEMBERS
The three principal powers haggled long and hard over the
inclusion of additional permanent members. 45 The United States
lobbied hard for China and, initially, for Brazil, 46 while France owes its
47
place to the efforts of Britain.
The Soviets were leery about the
48
powers.
other
any
of
addition
The United States believed Brazil belonged on the Security
Council due to its size, resources, and its contribution of troops to

39 Zhongyun, supra note 36; HILDEBRAND, supra note 22, at 135; HENRY
KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 414 (Touchstone 1995).
40 HOOPES, supra note 27, at 207.
41 Id. at 102 (quoting SUMNER WELLES, SEVEN DECISIONS THAT
SHAPED
HISTORY
42 172 (Harper & Brothers 1951)).
Id. at 102.
43
Id. at 207.
44 Henry Trofimenko, A Hope That Still Might Come True, in OAKS
CONVERSATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1944-1994, at 45 (Harvard
University Press 1998).
45 See HILDEBRAND, supra note 23, at 123; HOOPES, supra note 27, at 100;
KISSINGER, supra note 39, at 414, 421.

46 See HILDEBRAND, supra note 23, at 123; HOOPES, supra note 27, at 100.

47 See HILDEBRAND, supra note 23, at 122-23.
48
1Id. at 122, 125.
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World War I combat. 49 However, the British and Soviets pushed back
on the idea. 50 The United States did not press the issue for two reasons:
First, a driving reason for Brazil's inclusion was equitable geographic
representation, and the United States, after pushing so hard for the
"Four Policemen" idea, did not want to "reopen the question of
the
regionalism in general." 51 Second, Brazil was simply far below
52
rank of "Great Power" economically, politically, and militarily.
However, at the time, the same faults underlaid the inclusion of
China53 and France.54 China was hardly a country at the time,55 and
France was a shell of its former power. 56 Britain, conscious of the
balance of European power, wanted France as a bulwark on the
continent against Soviet expansion. 57 Roosevelt wanted China included
because Chinese forces were actively fighting Japan. 58 Britain objected
49 See HILDEBRAND, supra note 23, at 124.

The US also wanted Latin
America represented, but it was doubtful that Portuguese-speaking Brazil
would have been accepted as a representative of mostly Spanish-speaking
South50America. Id.
d. at 125-27.
51Id. at 125. There was a fear that revisiting the issue would result in
Britain and the Soviets weakening the Council by pushing for other "lesser
states" in response. Id.
52 Id.

53 "China" did not necessarily mean the People's Republic of China of
today, founded by Mao Zedong. Most American involvement during the war
was with the Nationalist China of Chiang Kai-shek, which would later be
pushed to Formosa, modem-day Taiwan. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE
COLDEST WINTER 223-29 (Hyperion 2007) (discussing the "illusory" proAmerican China led by Kai-shek and their Communist counterparts).
54 See HILDEBRAND, supra note 23, at 126. "A study by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff indicated that China could not become a Great Power in the foreseeable
future and ranked France below Great Britain in future war-making potential,
except in a land war on the European Continent. The Joint Chiefs did not
bother to analyze Brazil." Id.
55 See HALBERSTAM, supra note 53 (describing the ongoing conflict
between a weak Nationalist government and an emerging Communist force
both during World War II and after the war until the Nationalist collapse).
56 See HILDEBRAND, supra note 23, at 122. "France... had contributed too
little to the war effort to prove themselves worthy of so lofty a position ...
[After the war] France would be, in Stalin's view, a 'charming but weak"
country .... ." Id. (citing Account by Dr. Bowman, 15 Apr. 1944,
U3316/180/70, FO 371).
57 Zhongyun, supra note 36, at 56.
58 Id. at 55. It was also a nod to awakening nationalism in Asia. The
United States wanted to dispel rumblings that the West intended sole authority
over the world. Id.
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to China because it believed China would be a permanent friendly vote
for the United States, and the Soviets objected because doing otherwise
may have infringed on its neutrality treaty with Japan. 59 In the end,
each country withdrew its objection.60
5. THE VETO
61
The veto power has been controversial from the beginning.
The main dispute, fought between the consistently pro-veto Soviet
Union and the less certain British and Americans, raged over whether
the veto should be absolute or denied to a Great Power involved in the
controversy before the Security Council. 62 The dispute reflects the key
tension underlying the organization itself that exists even today: power
versus principle.

The "power" argument against restricting the veto proceeds
thusly: First, in order to succeed, any act by the UN must be
unanimous to enlist the resources and, more importantly, the will of all
the Great Powers. If every Great Power is not on the same side, the
possibility exists that a Power will join an opposing side, thereby
creating the very "world war the United Nations was designed to
prevent., 63 Furthermore, the value of a restricted veto in policing a
Great Power was illusory: no judgment could successfully be enforced
against it. 64 Any action against the Great Powers would have to take
place "outside of the framework" of the United Nations.65 Second,
"limiting the veto would put the power of decision in the hands of the
majority of smaller nations on the Security Council - nations that do
not have the resources required for enforcement."' 66 This would upend
the basic principle that those who are risking the most should decide
which risks to take.67

The "principle" camp, in favor of restricting the veto, responded:
If a Great Power can veto any action against itself, then the United

59 Id.
60 Id.

The Soviets only acquiesced when the US threatened to divert its

wartime aid to China rather than to the Soviets. Id.
61 See HILDEBRAND, supra note
62Id. at 183-84.

Id. at 184.
64id.
65 id.
66Id. at 185.
63

67

id.

23, at 183.
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Nations would have no more effect than the League of Nations. 6 If
only the lesser powers are subject to action, then the whole
organization becomes nothing more than an "alliance of the Great
Powers to maintain the status quo." 6 9 Second, a limit on the veto would

create for the United Nations the wide-spread moral authority among
the smaller nations that would be vital to many of its functions.7 °
Third, if no action could be enforced against a Great Power regardless,
then it had little to lose by being outvoted. 7' The very "Power" that
makes the nation "Great" would provide protection if the United
Nations were unfairly turned against it.72 If World War III were to
result from execution of the Council's duty, then at least the observing
world would
clearly know "which side was supported by right and
73
morality.
In the end, the dispute was not settled by internal debate. Both
the British and the United States capitulated to the adamant Soviets for
a number of reasons. First, the United Nations simply would not work
without the growing power of the Soviets.74 Second, the Soviets
absolutely refused to compromise.75 Finally, it was later argued that
the worst result of an unrestricted veto would only be to allow a power
to prevent possibly unwise action,
whereas a limited veto could allow
76
foolish, fractious uses of power.
C. THE USE OFFORCE

The United Nations deploys armed force in two very different
manners: peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
"[R]obust
peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as

6

1Id.at 184.

69

70

Id. at 184-85.

Id. at 185.

71 id

7Id.at 184-85.
73

184.
Trofimenko, supra note 44, at 45.

74 1d. at

75Id.
76

Id.at 42-43. "At the worst the principle of unanimity will only have the

effect of a veto, of preventing action where it may be wise or even necessary
....Where the people are drunk with newly-won power, it may not be so bad a

thing to have a brake like unanimity." Id.(quoting US Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, 2 vols.

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:837-38))

100
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envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter., 77 The former only allows
minimal use of force "at the tactical level" and only after the nation or
nations that are parties to the dispute have invited the introduction of
the peacekeeping force.78 The latter more closely resembles classical
warfare. No consent by parties is required, and the actions taken "may
involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level,
which is normally prohibited for Member States ...

by the Security Council.

unless authorized

79

Peacekeeping is by far the more common deployment of force by
the Security Council.8 0 The peacekeeping power is not expressly
written in the Charter, but the authority is implied. 8' A mission is
formed by the call for forces from member states or by the adoption of
a non-UN mission that is already in operation. s2 Peacekeeping involves
more diplomacy than actual use of force. Operations are designed "to
preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted,
and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the
peacemakers. 8 3
Missions require the consent of the parties,
84
impartiality of the personnel, and severe limits on the use of force.

77

U.N. Dep't. of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO], Dep't. of Field

Support [DFS], United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and
Guidelines,
34
(March2008),
available
at

http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/CapstoneDoctrine ENG.pdf

[hereinafter

Peacekeeping].
78 See id.
79
1Id. at 34-35.

80 There have been 63 peacekeeping operations since 1948, as opposed to
only two peace enforcement operations (Korea and Kuwait). U.N. Dep't of
Public Info. [DPI], Peace & Sec. Section, Background Note: United Nations
Peacekeeping
Operations, DPI/1634/Rev.99
(July
31,
2009),
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm. See HOOPES, supra note 27, at

217. However, peacekeeping missions do not have to originate in the Security
Council. The first operation recognized as "peacekeeping" originated in the
General Assembly in response to the Suez Canal Crisis. When the Security
Council failed to act on the seizure of the Canal by Israeli, French, and British
forces, the General Assembly, under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, created
a force of middle power troops to observe a withdrawal. MACQUEEN, supra

note 8, at 22-25.

81Peacekeeping,supra note 77, at 13-14.

82 U.N. DPI, Peace & Sec. Section, Meeting New Challenges Q & A
(2006) http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q8.htm [website inactive].
83 Peacekeeping,supra note 77, at 18.
" Id. at 31.
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Force can only be used in self-defense 85or to resist the forceful
prevention of the completion of the mission.
Eighteen peacekeeping operations are currently ongoing 86 and
have enjoyed significant success in brokering the trust between
disputing parties necessary to stabilize situations. 87 As of March 2008,
the largest contributors of uniformed personnel to peacekeeping
missions were, from highest to lowest, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India,
Nigeria, Nepal, Ghana, Jordan, Rwanda, Italy, Uruguay, Senegal,
China, France, Ethiopia, South Africa, Morocco, Benin, Brazil, Spain,
and Egypt. 88 The largest financial contributors were the United States,
Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, China, Canada,
Spain, South Korea, the Netherlands, Australia, Russia, Switzerland,
Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Greece. 89 More
often than not, peacekeeping missions revolve around the developing
post-colonial world. 90
In contrast, peace enforcement involves "combat operations...
to defeat aggression; it means taking sides, waging war and accepting
casualties as well as unexpected financial costs." 91 Only two examples
of enforcement exist in the history of the United Nations: the Korean
War and the First Iraq War.92 A United Nations command, however,
conducted neither operation. 93 Instead, the Security Council only
authorized the action; member states, particularly the United States,
Great Britain, and France, directly conducted the actual operations.94
85
86

1d. at 34.
U.N. DPKO, DPI, Fact Sheet,l, DPI/2429/Rev.4

(June 2009),

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf
[hereinafter FactSheet].
87
See, e.g., HOOPES, supra note 27, at 217.
88 FactSheet, 1, supra note 86.
89 id.
90 See Walid Khalidi, UN Peacekeepingduring the Cold War: Middle East
and Third World Perspectives, in THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS AND

THE UNITED NATIONS 1944-1994, 79, 79-80 (Ernest R. May & Angeliki E.

Laiou eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (reflecting that the United Nations "has
found itself engrossed to this day" with the consequences of decolonization
after World War II).
91HOOPES, supra note 27, at 217.
92HOOPES, supra note 27, at 217. Regarding the enforcement actions
in
Korea, the absence of the Soviet vote was critical to UN action. Had they
vetoed this issue, it is likely the US would have continued without UN approval

and the UN may have withered away, split between the US the UK and France
on one
hand and the Soviets on the other. Khalidi, supra note 90, at 83.
93
See id.
94 id.
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Without the active participation of these Great Powers, peace
enforcement is generally "beyond the means" of the United Nations
because of the lack
95 of will of member states to risk their troops in
combat operations.
II. REFORM PROPOSALS
Today's desire for reform is not the first effort in that direction.

Members previously reformed the Council by the ratification of a 1963
resolution expanding the number of non-permanent members from six
to ten. 96 The resolution stated that, because the United Nations had
swelled in numbers since its founding, a "more adequate geographical
97
representation" was necessary to make the organ more "effective."
98
Representation has been the main focus of reformers.
However, reformers have focused on many other issues including
effectiveness, procedural workings, openness of the Council, and scope
of the veto because it is a source of non-action, 99 particularly in cases
of genocide.100

95 HOOPES, supra note 27, at 218-19 (quoting former Secretary-General

Boutros Boutros Ghali, remarking on UN failures in Somalia and Bosnia before
U.S. involvement); "U.N. provided an important framework ...but the U.S.
was required to do the heavy lifting .... [N]o other nation or combination of

nations possesses anything approaching the power and mobility - the global
reach - of U.S. air, sea, and ground forces, supported by sealift, airlift, fixed
wing and helicopter air cover, satellite reconnaissance, and other forms of
intelligence gathering. Without U.S. leadership and participation, there can be
no effective response to serious aggression or other serious threats to general
peace." Id. at 220-21; See also Khalidi, supra note 90, at 83.
96 G.A. Res. 1991 (XVIII), at 21-22, (Dec. 17, 1963).
97Id.

See Jonas von Freieslben, Reform of the Security Council, in MANAG[NG
CHANGE AT THE UNITED NATIONS 1-3 (Center for UN Reform Education
98

2008) (providing a comprehensive history of Security Council reform efforts).
99U.N. GA, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Sec.
Council & Other Matters related to the Sec. Council,
14, 21, Doc A /61/47
(Aug. 7, 1997).
10oU.N. GA, High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A
More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility, 256, U.N. Doc. A/59/565
(Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf

[hereinafter High Level Panel Report] ("We also ask the permanent members,
in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the
veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses.").
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The new phase of reform began in 1992 with General Assembly
(GA) Resolution 47/62, which invited members to submit "written
comments on a possible review of the membership of the Security
Council." ° The invitation generated so many proposals that GA
Resolution 48/26 was passed.10 2 This resolution, highlighting the
growth in membership of developing countries and the end of the Cold
War, called for the creation of a working group to generate reform
proposals based on the ideas of increased efficiency and the "sovereign
equality of all Members of the United Nations."' 0 3 This "Open-ended
Working Group" was intended to provide a platform for any nation to
submit proposals and discuss plans for reforming the Security
Counci.10 4 Its work is ongoing.
A. THE OLD PROPOSALS
1. THE RAZALI PLAN
The Razali plan was the first comprehensive reform plan
produced by the working group) °5 The plan proposed an expansion in
Council membership and operating methods, noting that "the
effectiveness, credibility[,] and legitimacy of the work of the Security
Council depend on its representative character, on its ability to
discharge its primary responsibility and in carrying out its duties on
behalf of all members."' 0 6 The plan proposed the addition of five
permanent and four non-permanent seats.
One "developing" state
from each of Africa, Asia, and Latin America would get a new
permanent seat.'0 8 The other two permanent seats would be filled by
two "industrialized states."' 1 9 The four non-permanent seats were to be

'0'G.A. Res. 47/62, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/62 (Dec. 11, 1992).
102 Freieslben, supra note 98, at 4.
103 G.A. Res. 48/26, 29, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/26 (Dec. 3, 1993).
04
'
See id.
105 See generally Chairman of the Open-Ended Working Group on the
Question of Equitable Representation & Increase in the Membership of the Sec.
Council & Other Matters Related to the Sec. Council, Outline presented to the
Working Group (Mar. 20, 1997), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
component/content/article/200/413 I0.html.
106 id.

'07 Id at

1(a).

8
'. Id. at

l(b).

109 Id.

104
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filled with countries from each of10 Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and
Latin America and the Caribbean.'
The Razali plan also reflected that most of the member states
considered the Council's veto power to be anachronistic and
undemocratic." 1 As such, the veto would not extend to the new
permanent seats, and current permanent members were urged to refrain
from using their vetoes. 112
Finally, the Razali plan originated the often-repeated calls for
regularly-scheduled, open meetings allowing direct expression of
opinions by concerned states and organizations; regular consultations
between the Council, the other organs, and "affected" countries; regular
briefings to all member states; open debates to orient the Council
before taking decisions; clear delineations on what matters are
"procedural" and not subject to a veto; greater use of the International
Court of Justice for advisory opinions; and more consultations with
regional actors under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 1 3 While this
proposal was unsuccessful, it "led to resolution A/RES/53/30 passed on
23 November 1998 by the General Assembly ...stipulat[ing] that any
future resolutions on expanding the Security Council would need at
least a two-thirds majority to pass."' 14
2. HIGH LEVEL PANEL REPORT
In 2003, United Nations Secretary-General Koffi Annan renewed
the push for reform. His report "attempt[ed] to strike a balance ...
between two major considerations that . . . should govern the

composition of the Council: "contribution to the Organization
(financial, military, and diplomatic), on the one hand, and overall
'representativeness[],' on the other hand." '"1 5 The report consisted of
two proposals, Model A and Model B, both of which focused on a
regional distribution of seats.
Model A proposed three new non-permanent seats and six new
permanent, veto-less seats. 1 6 Two permanent seats were designated
"1°Id. at I.
"'1 Id.at 4.
1121id
"3 Id.at 9.

Freieslben, supranote 98, at 4-5.
115
Blum, supra note 19, at 632, 634 (2005).
114

116 High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, at

252. However, those

"permanent" seats may not be regarded as truly permanent until after a
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for Africa; two for Asia and the Pacific; one for Europe; and one for the
Americas. 117 Model B, on the other hand, created a completely new
category of seats instead of merely adding permanent seats. These new
seats would have held office for four years instead of two, and the
incumbent state would have been immediately available for reelection.118 Two four-year seats would have been reserved for Africa,
Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Americas.1 19 20Each plan would
have increased the Council to twenty-four members.'
Annan's report encouraged, but did not mandate, that seats on the
Council be filled by member states "among the top three financial
contributors" or "the top three troop contributors from their regional
area to United Nations peacekeeping missions."' 12' Finally, the report
proposed an "indicative voting" procedure whereby an action would
have a first vote with no effect or veto and a second formal vote under
the usual practice, which
it was believed would increase accountability
22
of the veto function.1

B. CURRENT MAJOR STA TE-SPONSORED PROPOSALS
1. G4 PLAN
2 3
is largely a fusion of the Model A plan with the
The G4 plan
underlying philosophy of the Razali plan. It marries Model A's focus

probationary period. Id. at 255. "Apparently the Panel would have preferred
not to include the addition of permanent members, but according to one
ambassador, the Secretary-General 'strong-armed' the panel into including that
option out of fear of alienating Germany and Japan in the upcoming summit."
Freieslben, supra note 98, at 5.
"7 High Level Panel Report, supra note 100, at
252; Ayca Ariyoruk &
Walter Hoffman, Special Paper No. 4: Security Council Reform Models:
Models A and B, Italian (Regional) Proposal,Blue and Green Models and a
New Model C, 2,Center for UN Reform (2005),
http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/148.
118 High Level PanelReport, supra note 100, at 253.
119Id
120

Id.at

252-53.

121Id. at 254.
122 Id.at 257.
123 Proposed by Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland,
India, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Maldives, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Poland,
Portugal, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Ukraine. G4 Draft Res., U.N. Doc.
A/59/L.64 (July 6, 2005).
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on enhancing "effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy" of the Security
Council by improving its "representative character" with the Razali
concern for developing nations. 124 The G4 plan also subtly broadens
the meaning of "security" under the Charter by claiming that "security
and development are intertwined and mutually reinforcing and that
25
development is an indispensable foundation of collective security."',
Therefore, the G4 plan claims to adequately identify and address the
security issues of "contemporary world realities" and that the Security
Council needs "the expansion of the members" to "enhanc[e] . . .
responsiveness to the views and needs of all Member States, in
particular developing countries ..
126
To achieve this responsiveness, the G4 plan would increase the
Council from fifteen to twenty-five members by adding six permanent
members and four non-permanent members. 27 The new seats would
more evenly diversify representation and widen the perspective of the
Council by reserving the new permanent seats to certain groups: two
from Africa, two from Asia, one from Latin America and the
Caribbean, and one from Western Europe and other states. 128 The new
non-permanent seats would seat one member from each of Africa, Asia,
Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean.129 The G4 plan
would not extend the veto to the new permanent members until a
review of the entire plan as implemented fifteen years after such
implementation. 1 30 The plan also "urges" the Council to work more
transparently by 3 reiterating many of the working reforms suggested in
the Razali plan.' '
2. UNITING FOR CONSENSUS
The Uniting for Consensus' 32 plan is essentially a reaction
against the alleged efforts of certain G4 plan proponents to become

24

1

Id. at pmbl.

Id.

125
126 id.

27Id. at
128

id.

id.
13 Id. at
1311Id. at
129
0

1.
5, 7.

8.
132 Proposed by Canada, Italy, Colombia and Pakistan, Argentina, Costa
Rica, Malta, Mexico, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey.
Uniting for Consensus Draft Res., U.N. Doc. A/59/L.68 (July 21, 2005).
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permanent members of the Council. 33 Supporters of the Uniting for
Consensus plan favor a variant Model B proposal which they believe is
flexible and more representative. 34 Representation seems again the
primary driving force for reform. The plan describes the Security
Council as "inequitable and unbalanced" and asserts that any expansion
"should make it more democratic, more equitably representative, more
transparent, more effective and more accountable."' 35 Accordingly, the
plan pushes for an expansion of non-permanent seats through a regular
election process, which would be "the strongest means to promote real
accountability, [by] allow[ing] for frequent rotation and fair and
equitable representation ....

136

The plan also calls for increasing the number of Council
members from fifteen to twenty-five. 137 The five permanent seats
would remain unchanged; the twenty non-permanent seats would be
held for two years and would be redistributed along these lines: "six
from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American
and Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States;
[and] two from Eastern European States."'' 38 The non-permanent
members would be available for139immediate re-election if approved by
their respective regional groups.
This plan echoes the preceding calls for working method
reforms, particularly the call for "transparency in decision-making" of
the Council and "fairer opportunities [for] participation of Member
133 See Press Release, Uniting for Consensus Group, Uniting for
Consensus Group of States Introduces Text on Security Council Reform, U.N.
Doc. GA/10371 (July 26, 2005) (claiming the G4 plan would benefit only a
"happy few"). India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan are all favorites under the G4
plan. Pakistan, the regional rival to G4 supporter, India, points out that the G4
plan would not increase representation as "[p]ermanent members [do] not
represent their region, only themselves. The G4 countries were seeking
permanent
membership for themselves, not for their regions." Id.
134 id.
135 Uniting for Consensus Draft Res., U.N. Doc. A/59/L.68 (Jul. 21, 2005).
136 id.
3

1 7 id.
38

1 1d. at

139 Id. at

4.

4, 5. The plan
[r]ecommends that each of the five existing geographical

groups, as identified in paragraph 4 above, shall decide on
arrangements among its members for re-election or rotation
of its members on the seats allotted to the Group; those
arrangements shall also address, as appropriate, a fair
subregional representation[.] Id. at 5.
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States[.]"' 140 It also calls for "restrictions on the veto power with a view
to its eventual elimination.'

141

3. EZULWINI CONSENSUS
The Ezulwini Consensus 142 is the group position of African
states, which have argued that the Council is "undemocratic ' ' 143 and
unable to guard lesser states against the major powers. 144 The
Consensus hopes that redressing the imbalance on the Council between
the developing and the developed worlds will better secure "the three
categories of freedom, namely, freedom from want, freedom from fear
and freedom to live in dignity" that are "indispensable" for
international peace and security.145 The Consensus further states that
these freedoms can be won and safeguarded "only through an effective
management of the current United Nations system."' 146
These
statements by the African Union reflect a shifting interpretation of the
role and purpose of the Security Council. Under this plan, the Council
moves from an enforcement body concerned with defeating aggression
to a guarantor of general, ill-defined freedoms. The role of the United
Nations broadens under this plan from a convenient platform for
48
147
to the "only" means of protecting those freedoms.
collective action

140Id.at

17, 8.
141
Id. at pmbl.
142

Proposed by Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,

Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, C6te d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia,
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Ezulwini
Consensus Draft Res., U.N. Doc. A/59/L.67 (July 14, 2005).
143 Most African states had no voice for their interest at the formation of
the United Nations. "[A]s a result, Africa remains to this day the only
continent without a permanent seat in the Council[.]" Id. The speaker is wrong.
South America is not represented on the Council, though it was, at least,
considered for a permanent seat. See HILDEBRAND, supra note 23, at 123-27.
144Saeed Shabazz, Africa Presses Demand for Security Council Seat,
FINAL CALL (Dec. I1, 2007), availableat http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/
reform/clusterl /2007/1211 afiicaseat.htm.
145
Ezulwini Consensus Draft Res., U.N. Doc. A/59/L.67 (July 14, 2005).
146 id,

147
UN Charter art. 1, paras. 3-4.
148 Ezulwini Consensus Draft Res., supra note 145.
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The Ezulwini Consensus expands the Council to twenty-six
members and seats the new members as follows: two permanent and
two non-permanent states from Africa; two permanent and one nonpermanent state from Asia; one non-permanent Eastern Europe state;
one permanent and one non-permanent state from Latin America and
the Caribbean; and one permanent seat from Western Europe and other
149
states.
The African Union itself would select the states for the
African permanent seats. 150 Though the issue is not mentioned in the
plan, the other regions would also presumably select their own new
permanent members. All new permanent members would receive full
veto rights.151
4. S5 PLAN
The S5 plan 152 is a modest attempt at reforming the Council's
working methods. The plan suggests a number of improvements to
"enhance the accountability, transparency and inclusiveness of
its
153
work, with a view to strengthening its legitimacy and effectiveness."'
These administrative measures include institutionalizing regular, open
exchanges between the Council members and affected member states;
making regular reports to the General Assembly on topics and areas of
concern; adding non-Council member states to subsidiary committees
when those states have a strong interest or expertise in the particular
subject; and establishing after-action review sessions
to accurately
54
account for the implementation of Council decisions. 1
More substantive suggestions are also expressed in the S5 plan.
Permanent members are asked to voluntarily abstain from exercising
the veto in any matter of "genocide, crimes against humanity and
serious violations of international humanitarian law.' ' 55 However, if a
veto is cast in any matter, the Council "should explain the reason for
doing so" and publish the explanation to the United Nations as a
whole. 56
Large troop contributors should be consulted more
thoroughly and regularly in regards to the risks their uniformed
149 id.
150 Shabazz, supranote 144.
1Si Ezulwini Consensus Draft Res., supra note 145.
152 Proposed on March 17, 2006, by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein,
Singapore, and Switzerland. S5 Draft Res., U.N. Doc. A/60/L.49 (Mar. 17,
2006).
153 Id.

154 1d. at

1.

1
5"Id.
at Annex
56

1 1d. at Annex

14.
13.
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personnel will face while peacekeeping. 157 The plan also encourages
the Council to increase its effectiveness through closer coordination
with regional groups, as contemplated under Chapter VIII of the
Charter. 158 Finally, the plan suggests formally incorporating the "best
practices" of the Council directly into the rules of procedure and
distributing these rules and practices to prospective members to
eliminate the
members. 159

learning

curve that

hampers

new non-permanent

5. OVERARCHING PROCESS

The Overarching Process is an attempt to break the impasse that
had settled between

G4,

Uniting for Consensus,

and Ezulwini

Consensus. The attempt puts in firm terms only those reform measures
that are common among the proposals and leaves all the major
differences "open for negotiation."' 6 In simple terms, the Overarching
Process is an agreement to agree on the basic points from which
talking and the
negotiations will proceed and to leave "the
' 6 1 'real tough
dealing' for the negotiations themselves."'
The Council tentatively grows to twenty-two, although the
number is, like the other terms in the plan, negotiable. 62 The seven
new seats are distributed as follows: two seats to Africa; two seats to
Asia; one seat to Latin America and Caribbean; one seat to Western
Europe and others; and one seat to Eastern Europe.' 63 They would be
elected through the normal General Assembly process. 164 The length of
the membership and type of seat. are left to later negotiations with many
options expressly left on the table. All new seats could be, for
example, the same as current non-permanent members; more than two
years but still term limited and non-renewable; term limited but
renewable; permanent but subject to a "review" period; long-term but
subject to a "challenge" from a regional competitor; or permanent with
57

1d. at Annex
Id. at Annex
5
9 Id. at Annex
58

160

2008,

16.
17.
18.

Six Member States Submit New Proposal,ReformtheUN.org, Mar. 27,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2008/0327unreform.htm

(last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
161 id.
162
Overarching Process

Draft

Proposal,

Mar.

17,

2008,

http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&file
Id=291 0 [hereinafter OverarchingProcess].
163

Id.

64id.
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or without a veto.' 6 5 The seats could also be of mixed types as long as
half of a region's seats remain normal two-year seats. 166 The plan
would leave implementation in any form subject to a probationary
review period. 16 Finally,16 most of the S5 working method reforms
would be put into practice. 8
C. CURRENT MINOR STA TE-SPONSORED PROPOSALS
1. ITALIAN PROPOSAL
The Italian proposal is unique in that the plan creates actual
regional seats, not seats for individual states assigned by region. By
embedding truly regional voices on the Council, wider collective
interests may triumph over the more narrow interests of single states. 169
The Italian proposal gives two additional permanent but veto-less seats
to Africa, Asia, Western Europe and other groups, Latin America and
the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe. "Each regional group would have
the 'operational management' of the seats and . . . would define
principles and mechanisms with appropriate checks and balances to
prevent national
occupation of the seats and ensure regional
70
representation."
2. PANAMA PROPOSAL
In 2007, Panama proposed a simple plan to increase member
representation. Under its proposal the Security Council would seat an
additional six members with five-year renewable terms.' 7' The seats
165

ReformtheUN.org, supra note 157. "Challenges could be made at

specific intervals (the text suggests five years). (Option to remove the
restriction that the challenge must be directed at a state from one's own
region.)" Id.
166 Id. "For example, if Latin America and the Caribbean gained two seats
through reform, the region would have a total of four seats on the Council. Two
of those would have to be two-year elected seats. The other two seats could be
of a different length." Id.
167 Overarching Process, supra note 159.
168

Id.

169 Ariyoruk, supra note 117,

at 3, http://www.centerforunreform.org/

node/148 (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
170 id.

171Five New Tracks for Security Council Reform; Panama Proposes
Transitional
Model,
ReformtheUN.org
(Feb.
14,
2007),
http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/eupdate/2899 (last visited Apr. 10,
2009).
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would be spread among the current regions: two for Asia, two for
Africa, one for Latin America and the Caribbean, and one for Western
Europe and other States.' 72 Any state elected "for four consecutive
terms . . . would automatically become,
and for this reason only, a
73
permanent member" with no veto.
D. ACADEMIC PROPOSALS
1. MODEL C
Model C is a commentator's variation on Models A and B which
retains the old models' focus on equitable representation through
increased membership. 174 Membership would be increased and
distributed in the same manner as Model A or B, but would create a
new Pacific Rim region.' 75 The Pacific Rim group would consist of the
U.S., Canada, Japan, the Philippines, the states other than China along
the East Asian coastline, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island
States, while the Asian Group would consist of China plus south and
southwest Asia. 76
The model is designed to 77provide "greater
recognition" to the large populations of Asian states.
Under Model C, the Council would seat twenty-five members in
four different categories of seats. 178 It would retain the original five
permanent members but redistribute the ten two-year term seats
members: three to Africa; two to Asia; one to Europe; two to the
Pacific Rim; and two to Latin America and the Caribbean. 179 The plan
172 Id.
173 Update on the Resumption of the Discussions on Security Council

Reform at the General Assembly, Center for UN Reform Education (Feb. 9,
2007), http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/239.
174 Ariyoruk, supra note 117, at 4. "Today the number of UN Member
states has reached 191, and a further enlargement is clearly essential." Id.
175Id.
176 Id.

177 Id.
'78 Id. at 4-5.
179
Prof. Hoffman provides the following example roster to help
understand the concept:
A possible Model C for a 25 member Council might then
look like this: Europe-three permanent members (UK,
France, Russia), one eight-year term possibly shared
initially by Germany and Italy, and one four year term,
either Ukraine or Sweden, for the current top peace
operation contributor. Pacific Rim-one permanent member
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then creates one four-year renewable seat and one eight-year renewable
seat for each region. The eight-year seats would be "dual-seated,"
meaning that two nations would occupy the seat on a two-year
rotation. 0 The dual seat is meant to reduce "political rancor from the
large states in each region which are not selected."' 8'
The four-year
seats are reward seats. Each region selects the constituent nation that
has contributed most to peacekeeping and other82 United Nations
operations and that has met its financial obligations.
2. MODEL X
None of the proposals has yet gained wide spread support.
Model X is an attempt to make Model B more palatable to more
member states.' 8 3 The plan sacrifices some equitable representation in
84
favor of a smaller, more efficient Council of no more than twenty.1
However, the developing world is not neglected. Regional disputes are

(U.S.), one eight-year term, possibly shared initially by
Japan and Australia; one four year term for Canada, the
current top peace operation contributor; and two two-year
non-renewable seats. South and Southwest Asia-one
permanent seat (China), one eight-year term, possibly
shared initially by India and Indonesia; one four-year term
for the current top peace operation contributor either
Pakistan or Bangladesh; and two two-year non-renewable
seats. Latin America & the Caribbean- no permanent
member, one eight-year term possibly shared initially by
Brazil and Mexico; one four-year term for the current top
peace operation contributor, Uruguay; and two two-year
non-renewable seats. Afirica-no permanent member, one
eight-year term, possibly shared initially by Nigeria and
South Africa, (perhaps later by Egypt and Ethiopia); one
four year term for the current top peace operation
contributor, Ghana; and three two-year non-renewable
seats. Id.at 5.
80
' Id. at 4-5.
l81

Id.at 4.

182
183

Id. at 5.
See Walter Hoffman, Special PaperNo. 8: A Competing Model: A

Security Council with 20 members, Center for UN Reform (2006),
http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/52.
14 id
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sidelined by proposing no new permanent seats. 185
86 Finally, this plan
rewards major contribution to the United Nations.'
Model X adds "five four-year renewable term seats; two fouryear renewable seats for Africa, two for Asia, and one for the Americas
and the Pacific."' 87 Each region would itself control whether a member
was renewed or re-elected. 188 Europe is denied a new seat, which
somewhat 89redresses their overrepresentation among the permanent
members.'
3. A REGIONAL ECONOMIC PLAN
One commentator's plan would build a new Council based on
relative population and economic power. The plan is radical but
arguably necessary because the current Council is "unrepresentative,
illegitimate, and increasingly ineffective in dealing with crises ...."190
The new Security Council would be comprised of ten new
regional groups: Northern America, Latin America, Europe, SubSaharan Africa, Middle East, Northern Eurasia, Southern Asia, Eastern
Asia, Southeastern Asia and The Pacific.' 9' Participation in a region
would be limited to states with a population of at least four million or
"a GDP(PPP) 92 of at least 40 billion constant US dollars .... ,'
The
regional groupings attempt to equally distribute representation
according to population and wealth, while separating nations with bad
histories or who would always be outvoted. 194 The ten groups would

185

Id.

186 Id.
187
id.
188 id.
189 Id."Model

X has kept in mind the possibility that the European Union
may claim a permanent seat in lieu of the United Kingdom and France." Id.
190 Richard Hartwig, Squaring the Circle:A Regional/EconomicProposal

for Reform of the UnitedNations Security Council, in The Quest for Regional
Representation - Reforming the United Nations Security Council, CRITICAL
CURRENTS No. 4 43 (Dag Hammarskj6ld Found. 2008), available at
http://www.dhf.uu.se/criticalcurrentsno4.html.
'9'Id.at

192

52.

Gross Domestic Product at purchasing power parity.

'9'
Id.at 52.
194Id.at 58. For example, India and Pakistan would be separated into

different regions because of their history. Also, Canada and Mexico would not
be in the North America group because the US would always be the dominant
anchor country because of its GDP. Id.
at 58.
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be headed by "an anchor country, or by co-anchor countries. ' ' 195 A vote
could only be cast by any region on a specific issue when backed by
individual states "representing 60 percent of its population and 60
percent of its ... GDP(PPP)."' 196 The plan refers to this as the "60/60
rule," which governs all votes save those cast in emergency
situations. 197 In the case of an emergency, the anchors, or co-anchors,
can vote their will. 198 The wealthiest regions, those "with at least 18
percent of the combined GDP (PPP) of all Regions," would receive an
additional two votes. 99 This plan eliminates the veto because the
gridlock and inaction caused by the veto could "severely damage[] the
UN" as it did "during the Cold War. 200
III. COMPARING THE REFORMS TO THE PURPOSE OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL

Recurring themes and shared concerns run through a majority of
the proposals. Increased membership, the elimination or limitation of
the veto, and improved working methods are common pleas. Some of
these ideas cannot help but improve the Security Council. However,
not all of these reforms are appropriate. Some risk the foundations of
the modern era of peace. Other reforms, though possibly quite safe and
even beneficial, create a structure that barely resembles the Council that
the original signatories agreed upon.
A. INCREASED MEMBERSHIP
Increased membership is called for by every proposal except the
S5 plan. 20 1 The different plans offer a variety of reasons to increase
membership. The Razali, G4, United for Consensus, REP, and Model
C plans, in particular, argue that the Council's effectiveness, credibility,
and legitimacy depend on a representative character that the current
body lacks. 20 The High Level Panel Report, G4, and Model C plans
195

d.at 44.

196Id.
19 7
1d.
198 Id. A situation is declared an "emergency" by a procedural vote among
the regions. Co-anchors only cast halfa vote. Id.at 61.
99

' Id. at 44.
200 Id. at 51.
201 See S5 Draft Res., supra note 152.
202 See Chairman of Open-Ended Working

Grp., supra note 105; see

United for Consensus Draft Res., supra note 135; see Hartwig, supra note 190;
see Ariyoruk, supra note 117.
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also add that a membership increase would create a Council better
conformed to the actual contribution of states. 20 3 The Ezulwini
Consensus, on the other hand, argues for increased membership based
almost on essential fairness and egalitarian values.2 04 In calling for
increased membership, the plans all make valid points, but those plans
both ignore the original purpose of the Council and neglect the
functional complications that the changes may cause.
The Security Council, as we have seen in Part I, was never
intended to be totally "representative. 2 5 Rather, the Council is the
meritocratic core of great power that protects the liberal democratic
body of the United Nations. 20 6 Therefore, arguments like that of the
African Union seem to be incomplete: while the absence of an African
state on the permanent Council is assuredly unfair in a geographical
sense, the absence is absolutely fair in a practical sense. No modem
African state has achieved great power status, and difficult to support is
that adding a developing state to the Council would contribute to the
Council's core of protective power. However, many proposals argue
that a more geographically representative Council would, by virtue of
diversity, increase legitimacy, thereby making the Council more
effective. "Effective" here can be interpreted to imply different
problems. The reference could be to the Council's failure to effectively
resolve situations like those in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, Darfur and
the Congo. 20 7 However, "effective" could also refer to the need to
recapture the Council's image as a united body pursuing a collective
security purpose. Including different viewpoints on the Council would
undercut the world impression of the Council as a "self-appointed
oligarchy ' ' 2° 8 or a tool for the advancement of Western interests. 2 09 It is
203

See High Level Panel Report, supra note 100; see G4 Draft Res., supra

note 123; see Ariyoruk, supra note 117.

See Ezulwini Consensus Draft Res., supra note 145.
See HOOPES, supra note 27, at 100.
206Id.at 108-09; Zhongyun, supra note 36.
207 See Toro, supra note 21; Associated Press, U.N. Chief: Rwanda to
204
205

Establish

Ties

with

Congo,

MSNBC.coM,

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29454497/from/ET/
defends peacekeeping against criticisms).

Mar.

1,

2009,

(wherein Ban Ki-moon

208 James Paul and C6Iine Nahory, Theses Towards a Democratic Reform
of the UN Security Council, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, July 13, 2005,

http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&file
Id= 1626.

209 Brian D. Kreykes, A Case For Delegation: The UN. Security Council,
Regional Conflicts, and Regional Organizations, 11 TOURO INT'L L. REv. 1

(2008); see Shabazz, supra note 144. "Angolan Ambassador Ismael A. Gaspar-
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unclear, however, how any of the proposals pushing for wider
membership would repair these effectiveness problems.
If the problem is gridlock or inactivity within the Security
Council, increasing membership is probably not a solution.21 °
"[C]onsensus in political issues is extremely difficult to obtain when
fifteen representatives are vying for their national interests, so what is
the logic in expanding membership by another nine, ten, or eleven
votes? ' 211 In addition, the veto is the single largest obstacle to Security
Council action. 212 Any plan that creates new permanent members
armed with the veto may exacerbate this obstacle.
If the problem is the lack of perspective on the Council, there is
no guarantee that new members would actually widen the
perspective. 213 If self-interest governs the decision-making of current
permanent members, why would it not also govern the new
members? 214 There is also a possibility that any expansion of
permanent members would increase the number of privileged states
rather than democratize the Council.2 1 5
Membership increase is also argued in terms of the equitable
representation of contribution rather than geography. This concern is

Martins argued it was time to redress the 'historical injustice' of the African
continent not having permanent representation. African leaders have argued the
current configuration of the Security Council is undemocratic. Some complain
that the council has shown an inability to protect weaker states against the U.S.
and other major powers." Id.
210 Blum, supra note 19, at 644. "Such an increase may well change
the
dynamics of the Council, its capacity to work expeditiously and to take firm
decisions, as expected from it under Article 28 of the Charter. While it is
impossible to devise precise arithmetical criteria to determine the point at
which the enlargement of the Council may become counterproductive, such a
point certainly exists and will have been reached when the increase in the
Council's membership forms a critical mass that could make its decisionmaking process much more cumbersome." Id.
211 Toro, supra note 21.
212 See Jan Wouters & Tom Ruys, Security Council Reform: A New Veto
for a New Century, in EGMONT PAPER 9 (Royal Inst. for Int'l Relations (IRRIKIIB), Brussels) (2005), at 16, 17 (providing an overview of veto use to block
U.N. operations).
213 Toro, supra note 21.
214 Id. "If one examines the majority of the proposals, it would be fair to
say that nations partake in this reform process for one of two reasons: Either
they want to join the Security Council on a permanent basis, or they want to
impede
2 15 their rival from joining the Security Council." Id.
See id.
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more consistent with the original intent of the drafters, who weighed
not only the capabilities of France, China, and Brazil but also their
willingness to contribute to the execution of a war. 21 6 The current
arguments for a representative increase, however, are supported by the
contributions of money and troops to peacekeeping operations. While
these may be good criteria for electing non-permanent members, they
are not necessarily good indicators of a nation's ability to bear the
weight of peace enforcement, the primary responsibility of permanent
members. As explained in Part I, peacekeeping and peace enforcement
are dissimilar operations that tax different capabilities. For example,
Pakistan is the greatest contributor in sheer numbers to
peacekeeping. 1 7 In that role, Pakistan can rely on other participating
United Nations states to help deploy and transport a small military
force and to keep that force properly supplied for a predetermined
amount of time. As a permanent member waging war on an aggressor
state, however, Pakistan may be incapable of contributing on par with
the United States, China, or even Britain or France, for a variety of
reasons. A country having a weak, unstable government with poor
internal security, a strong enemy on its border, and a deteriorating
economy21 would be unable to project significant military power
beyond its own borders. Other high contribution states-all likely
permanent members under most of these proposals-would
similarly
219
lack this critical ability to project military power.
See HILDEBRANI6, supra note 23, at 123-25.
217 Fact Sheet, supra note 86.
218 See Background Note: Pakistan, U.S. Department
216

of State,

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm (summarizing Pakistan's economy,
history, and government); Pakistan: Militants Suffer Heavy Casualties as

Fighting Rages, CNN.CoM, Sept. 1, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/
WORLD/asiapcf/09/01/pakistan.fighting/index.html?iref--newssearch.
219 India has two major enemies on its borders, Pakistan and China, and
lacks both a substantial "blue water" navy and any advanced airbome forces.
Stephen F. Burgess, India's Emerging Security Strategy, Missile Defense, and
Arms Control, OCCASSIONAL PAPER 51, (USAF Inst. for Nat'l Sec. Studies),

June
2004
at
33,
34,
available at http://www.usafa.edu/
df/inss/OCP/OCP54.pdf. Brazil also lacks a blue water navy and maintains
only a single aircraft carrier without proper support vessels capable of
defending it from an attack. Brazilian Navy - Marinha do Brasil,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/

navy.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009); See Mario Osava, Security Council
Reform Not Just a Question of Numbers, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, July 5, 2005,

http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200/41210.html
("But
Brazil lacks one credential that is decisive: a military that is capable of rapid
intervention abroad 'to impose peace' rather than merely maintain it[.]"). Japan
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While significant money contributions may support the
qualification of a potential permanent member, economic power is
generally difficult to bring to bear on potential security threats.
Sanctions have proven less than effective over the years. 220 In the
modem world economy, economic warfare has the potential to damage
parties beyond the target state and tends to work best in conjunction
with military efforts. 221 Of course, economic power can be converted
domestically into military power, but the time necessary for conversion
may limit the economic power's utility to an organization designed to
respond swiftly to aggression.
Despite these criticisms, large contributions of troops and money
to peacekeeping operations demonstrate some quantum of will that
should be required of permanent members. Ultimately, the will of the
members to meet and defeat a threat to international peace and security
decides the success or failure of the Council.222
B. THE VETO
No plan approves of the unrestricted veto. Only the Elzuwini
Consensus would extend the power to new permanent members. The
remaining proposals condemn the power as anachronistic and
undesirable. The veto carries the most blame for the Council's
ineffectiveness.223 The frustration is understandable. The veto is often
"used in order to protect countries with which [permanent members]
have close cultural, economic and/or political ties," most notoriously in

is forbidden by its constitution from anything but purely defensive war. "The
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. JapanIntroduction, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/japan/intro.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
220 Consider how ineffective sanctions have been against North Korea. See
Associated Press, No Decision from U.N. Meeting on North Korea,
MSNBC.coM, Apr. 5, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30035197/
from/ET/. Their affect is very hard to accurately measure anyway. See Franklin
Foer, Economic Sanctions, SLATE, Sept. 14, 1996, http://www.slate.com/
id/1034/.
221 See Eamon Javers, Pentagon Preps for Economic Warfare,
POLITICO.coM,
Apr.
9,
2009
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0409/21053.html (describing the results of an economic war game).
222 Helen Leigh-Phippard, Remaking the Security Council: The Options, in
DOCUMENTS ON REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 421 (Dartmouth Publ'g Co.

1997).

223 Kreykes, supra note 209.
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situations of mass genocidal killings. 224 Most of the reforms call for
some form of restraint, if not outright elimination, of the veto.
Nevertheless, those who assume these positions misunderstand
the purpose of the Council. The Council was never intended as a tool
225

to deal with internal conflicts,

to prevent violence, or arguably to

226

prevent all war.
The purpose of the Security Council is to "maintain
international peace and security." 227 The veto is a cornerstone of this
duty. It "guarantee[s] peaceful relations among the world's main
powers and [assures the United Nations] their support in order to make
it sufficiently credible and vigorous" by "introducing a mechanism to
safeguard the vital interests of the most important states. 228
As an example of the necessity of the veto, consider this
scenario: The Security Council motions to sanction Sudan for actions in
Darfur by prohibiting exportation of oil from Sudan. 229 China, which
purchases large stocks of oil from Sudan, strongly opposes any trade
sanctions.230 With the veto in place, China can exercise the veto right
under the Charter and kill the motion. This results in no change to the
situation in Darfur, which is a tragic consequence but not a major threat
to international security. However, removing the veto results in China
simply being outvoted. The sanction goes forward, but what is the
effect?

Would China abide by the sanction?

Possibly not. 231

What

happens when China, a rising superpower and a permanent member of
the Security Council, flouts a Council resolution?

224
225

Wouters, supra note 212, at 31.
HOOPES, supra note 27, at 101.

minor threat might arise from .

.

Roosevelt, at least, thought so. "A

. civil war in a small country, or a border

dispute between small neighboring states[, but] this could be dealt with by...
'quarantine' measures." Only major threats would be dealt with -by direct
intervention from the Security Council. Id.

226 See id. (FDR at least saw no threat worthy of the U.N. in limited
"border disputes" between states); U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 & Preamble
(referencing the two World Wars, rather than all war, in the language "to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
has brought untold sorrow to mankind").
227 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
228 Wouters, supra note 212, at 25.
229 The principles demonstrated in this scenario are drawn from the

arguments between the American negotiators at Dumbarton Oaks. See
HILDEBRAND, supra note 23, at 183-84.
230 See Hillary Anderson, China 'Is Fuelling War in Darfur', BBC NEWS,
July 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7503428.stm.
231 See

id.
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The first possibility is that nothing happens. China is militarily
and economically strong. Any punitive action by the Council against
China would cost lives, money, or both, so there would be little support
for action. The Security Council would be shown as weak and
ineffectual, much like the League of Nations. Any credibility the
Council gained by becoming fair and democratic would be countered
by its suddenly revealed impotence.
On the other hand, the Security Council could act against China
and break apart. If the Council acts through sanctions, the world may
experience severe problems as one of the larger world economies
becomes inaccessible. The chance also exists that some states would
decide they cannot afford to cease trade with China and ignore the
Council. If the Council takes military action, the major militaries and
nuclear powers of the world go to war with each other across oceans
and continents-the very thing the veto power is designed to prevent.232
The veto power is not truly a power granted by the Charter, but rather
the Charter's recognition of the fact of power. If major powers are
robbed of the veto and are constantly outvoted by the institutions that
rest on their effective power, for what reason would they continue to
underwrite those institutions? Thus, removing the veto could
ultimately
233
result in the withdrawal of the United Nation's power base.
On the other hand, voluntary restriction of the veto would be a
welcome, if unlikely, reform. The veto was only intended to be used to
protect "matters of vital importance to a permanent member," not to
"obstruct the operation of the Council. ' 234 This is consistent with the
intentions of the original drafters that the permanent members "keep
their power of the veto to protect their national interests while adhering
to the principles of saving 'succeeding generations from the scourge of
war. ,,,235

C. WORKING METHODS
Every plan agrees the Security Council should improve its
working methods. Changes to the procedural aspects of the Council are
the easiest to achieve because they are exempt from any veto. Regular
briefings and consultations with affected groups of states would

232 See HILDEBRAND, supra note
78.

23, at 183; see Khalidi, supra note 88, at

233 Leigh-Phippard, supra note 222, at 423.
234 Wouters, supranote 212, at 29.
235 Toro, supra note 21 (quoting U.N. Charter Preamble).
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provide non-permanent members with an opportunity for real
participation and control in Council decisions without substantial
infringement on permanent member rights and duties. 236 Replacing
secretive, informal decision-making sessions with more open hearings
Would prevent the exclusion of the non-permanent members and
"limit[] the spread of rumors that offend the integrity of the United
Nations. ''237
Nevertheless, even procedural reforms have drawbacks. For
example, extra meetings and briefings will inevitably slow what is
already a lengthy, deliberative process. However, requiring a member
to explain its use of a veto would be a minimal burden. The S5 plan
suggests that every veto should be accompanied by a published
justification. 238 "Although this idea is based more on diplomatic
courtesy and respect than precedence or Charters interpretation, it
provides a logical process by which the great divide between
[permanent members] and other member states can be at least slightly
bridged. ''239 The concept of full disclosure is closely related to
procedural reforms. Though not explicit in any plan, full transparency
would require a representative to disclose any national interests in a
question before acting thereon. 240 This places reasoning in the open
where it can be measured for fairness, and the state can be judged
accordingly.
D. REGIONAL PLANS

The Italian proposal and the Regional Economic Plan would
create a Council with regional seats. 241 The value of these plans is that
they create an organization that better acts for the world as a whole.
The narrowest self-interest could be defeated at the regional level
before it could poison any global decisions.
However, while the Charter creates a niche for traditional
regional organizations and alliances, 242 the United Nations is intended
236 International Peace Academy and the Stanley Foundation, Reform of
the Security Council: Memorandum Submitted to the President of the UN
GeneralAssembly, in DOCUMENTS ON REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 439-40

(Dartmouth Publ'g Co. 1997) [hereinafter PeaceAcademy].

Toro, supra note 21.
238 S5 Draft Res., supra note 152, at Annex 13.
239 Toro, supranote 21.
240 Peace Academy, supra note 236, at 448.
241 See Ariyoruk, supra note 117; see Hartwig, supranote 190.
242 U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1.
237
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to be an organization of states. Regional plans would require such
radical change to the organization that they would be as much a
replacement of the Security Council as a reform. The Regional
Economic Plan in particular is far more akin to setting up a world

government than balancing a collective-action platform between states.
Putting either of these plans into action would also be a major
undertaking. The Regional Economic Plan model of the Council is
comparatively byzantine and would at least require a uniform body to
vouch for accurate measures of national populations and GDPs used to
calculate relative power. The Italian plan ignores the lack of "capacity
243
[of most states] to manage a Security Council seat regionally.,
While most of Europe could easily be managed through the European
Union and parts of Africa through the African Union,
not every state is
244
represented in a comparable regional organization.
E. INCREASED USE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The S5 plan calls for more reliance on regional organizations.245
Closer coordination with regional organizations is completely within
the power of the Council, 246 and recent history has provided examples
of such reliance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
acted under the United Nations flag in Bosnia. 247 The African Union is
acting as a stabilizing force in Africa.248
The European Union,
meanwhile, is struggling to define the
interrelation
between itself and
249
its member states on the world stage.
However, the convenience and effectiveness of increased
reliance on regional organizations comes with a risk. The more the
Security Council delegates its duties, the greater the chance that the
243 Ariyoruk , supra note 117, at 3.
244 id.
245 S5 Draft Res., supra note 152.
246 See U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1.
247 See MACQUEEN, supranote 8, at 74.
248 See Anita Powell, African Union Suspends Madagascar,ABC NEWS,

Mar. 20, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/wireStory?id=7129517;
UN-A U PeacekeepingForce Carries Out Anti-banditry Patrols in Darfur, UN
NEWS
CENTRE,
Mar.
23,
2009,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=30264&Cr=darfur&Cr1 =.
249 See Jane Merrick, Britain Will 'Have to Give Up Seat On UN, Claims
Think-Tank,
DAILY
MAIL,
Aug.
15,
2007,
available
at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/clusterl/2007/0815giveup.htm
(discussing fear that sovereignty is being surrendered to EU).
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purpose of the United Nations will be subsumed by the diverging
purpose of the operating regional groups.2 5 0 For example, in Bosnia,
NATO essentially acted in the United Nations' stead, but the two
organizations interpreted differently the mission to remedy armed
conflict there. 2 5 1 NATO's more aggressive interpretation led to
punitive airstrikes against Serb forces, going beyond the Security
Council's authorization. 252 Eventually, continuing tension between the
two organizations led to the total displacement of UN peacekeeping
interests as NATO began increased artillery and air strikes to force a
treaty settlement.253 Likewise, deputizing a regional organization could
harm the credibility of an operation and restrict member state
participation. States that would eagerly aid the UN may be more
ambivalent towards NATO or the EU.
F. PANAMA PLANAND THE OVERARCHING PROCESS
While the Panama plan 254 carries some of the detriments
discussed under the "Increased Membership" section, the simplicity of
the proposal mitigates the risk of sacrificing effectiveness for
representativeness. The plan allows for increased representation, but
only after a twenty year trial period in which the capabilities and
selflessness of the
candidate are tested and subjected to approval by
255
popular acclaim.
However, if all the permanent seats were to be filled, the Council
would have eleven permanent members to ten non-permanent
members. The underprivileged class would be nearly useless against
the privileged majority that could then outvote it as well as call upon a
substantial veto power.256 Also, if a state were to obtain a permanent

250 See MACQUEEN, supra note 8, at 74.

251
Id.
252 id.
253 Id. The operation underwent a major shift from peacekeeping and "safe
havens" to peace enforcement. The UN later adopted the change, but what else
could it do at that point? The Dayton Accords, that formally ended the conflict,
had already been signed. See id.
254 See Five New Tracks, supra note 171.
255 See Update on the resumption of the discussions on Security Council
Reform at the General Assembly, Center for UN Education Reform, Feb. 9,
2007, http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/239.
256 See Blum, supra note 19, at 644 (suggesting that because the dynamic
of an increased counsel would be unclear "the delicate overall balance between
the permanent, semipermanent, and nonpermanent members of the Council--
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spot and become unaccountable in elections, the state would possibly

become just as self-interested as the original permanent members.

7

The Overarching Process 258 is less a plan and more an agreement
to possibly agree on some form of plan in the future. While this may
move the opening negotiations past the first impasse, it in no way
promises actual reform and carries forward all the benefits and
detriments of the plans previously discussed.
IV. CONCLUSION

The current round of United Nations reform is still in the early
stages, and the proposals range from modest suggestions to severe
rewriting of the Charter. However, none of the proposals advanced
address the effects on the primary function of the Council. Instead,
most speak of eliminating the veto and modifying the Council to
increase "fairness" or "legitimacy" or "representation." The working
group should not neglect the original intentions behind the Security
Council.
As he laid out the roots of the League of Nations before the
United States Senate, Woodrow Wilson said that "there must be, not a
balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries,
but a[n] organized peace." 25 9 He could just as well have been speaking
about the Security Council; it should be a "community of power," not a
balance. As such, equitable geographical representation should not be
sought in reforming the Council. Permanent regional seats, whether
held by organizations or states for no reason other than geographical
equity, skew the purpose of the council away from preventing world
war.

Inevitably, the Council one day will not reflect the true
"community of power" in the world. Reform is necessary. Therefore,

potential great powers should have a method of being inducted and,
though this is nowhere in the actual proposals before the UN, removed.
Membership should be determined by the same criteria used at the
formation of the Council: military capability, economic ability to

that is, a slight preponderance of nonpermanent members, as envisaged by the
founders of the United Nations-- should be preserved as far as possible.").
257 See Toro, supra note 21.
258 See Six Member States Submit New Proposal,supra note 160.
259 Woodrow Wilson, Peace Without Victory, Presidential Address to the
Senate Jan. 22, 1917, available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/
intrel/wwl5.htm (last visited Sep. 9, 2009).
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sustain peace enforcement, and the will to perform such a duty. 260 The
veto should, of course, be extended to any new member because it
allows a member to do by words alone what would otherwise be done
by force.
In the end, no reform can occur without surviving the veto of the
permanent members. 261 Therefore, the best plan would attempt to work
the reforms of the S5 plan into the procedural rules of the Security
Council. Those reforms would require only a majority vote by the
members. In addition, any reform proposal should share both the
support of permanent members and address the concerns shared by the
above plans. Since the original permanent members are likely to
jealously guard their interests, the proposal should not increase
membership greatly. At most, only two potential powers, amicable to
the current permanent members, should be considered for permanent
membership. Brazil and Nigeria are good candidates. 2 62 India is too
much a rival to China. 263 Germany and Japan are both strongly

260 From a purist perspective, the "same criteria" results in a very simple
test: If the UN cannot function without a particular state, that state should be a
permanent member on the council. It is not a standard that does much to
resolve the ongoing debate, but it is an honest one. For example, if Brazil or
India decided to withdraw from the UN unless it was placed on the Council,
would their withdrawal trigger a crisis, pull the support from major plans, or
endanger the Council's power to respond to a world threat? On the other hand,
if the US or China decided to withdraw from the UN if India or Brazil were
placed on the Council, that would be a different story. Suddenly, there would
be an independent power outside the UN that, by virtue of its military
(conventional and nuclear) and economic power, would be capable of
stalemating the remains of Security Council. Of course, this is not a workable
model as it invites crisis and feuding. Likewise, the world can't simply wait for
another crisis of World War II proportions to come along and then arrange a
new council accordingly.
261 U.N. Charter arts. 108, 109.

262 See Mario Osava, supra note 219 ("But 'if the Council is expanded, the
inclusion of Brazil is a given,' because 'it is the only country in the region with
the vocation of being a global actor[]'. . . It is only natural for Brazil to play a
regional leadership role due to the size of its economy, territory and
population[.]"); Background Note: Nigeria, US Department of State,
("[Nigeria] demonstrated its
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm
capability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain battalions in support of
peacekeeping operations[.]").
263 Alan Boyd, India, Japan Still Shooting for Security Council, Asia

Times (Feb. 26, 2004), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/
content/article/200/41181.html ("China, resentful of Japan's wartime
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opposed and do little to address inequities of representation.2 4 Brazil
and Nigeria are southern hemisphere states with vast natural resources
and secure borders, 265 and Nigeria could still be considered a
developing country. 266 These natural resources may one day translate

into major military and economic power. The addition of Nigeria
places a developing world viewpoint on the Security Council's table.
These reforms also increase geographical representation by ensuring
that each of the traditional regional groupings and continents sits on the
Council. These reforms also combine at least some element of each of
the member states' plans. No proposal will succeed without addressing
the concerns of all negotiating parties, particularly those of the
founding parties.

occupation and suspicious of India's regional ambitions, is still holding out
[against
264 the membership of India and Japan]").
Id.; Matthias Nass and Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Should Germany Be
on the Security Council?, Politik, Zeit Online, July 7, 2005 ("Why another
European power should become a permanent member is inexplicable.
..

Germany cannot claim to be a big power of the future.... Its economy

is stagnant. Its share of world trade is falling. Ditto the number of soldiers and
the number of citizens. Germany is a shrinking . . . country with growing
ambitions.. . . And Germany is openly opposed by Italy.... Other countries do

not want to expose themselves, yet hope for a German failure. And that is in
Europe alone. Thus, Germany's unilateral move jeopardizes a vital national
interest (European unity) in pursuit of a secondary interest (the Security
Council seat).").
265
Background Note: Brazil, U.S.
Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640.htm ("Brazil has one of the most
advanced industrial sectors in Latin America. Accounting for one-third of GDP,
Brazil's diverse industries include automobiles and parts, machinery and
equipment, textiles, shoes, cement, computers, aircraft, and consumer durables.
Brazil continues to be a major world supplier of commodities and natural
resources, with significant operations in lumber, iron ore, tin, other minerals,
and petrochemicals. . . .Brazil has traditionally been a leader in the interAmerican community and played an important role in collective security
efforts, as well as in economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.");
Background
Note:
Nigeria,
US
Department
of
State,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm ("In 2008, U.S. imports from
Nigeria were over $38 billion, consisting predominantly of oil. However,
rubber products, cocoa, gum arabic, cashews, coffee, and ginger constituted
over $70 million of U.S. imports from Nigeria in 2007.... Nigeria has enjoyed
generally good relations with its immediate neighbors.").
266 Nigeria, Country Specific Information, US Department of
State,
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa-tw/cis/cis_987.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2009).
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